All articlesPolitics & Regime

The notes treat the United States as an empire — Atlanticist, Protestant, financial-monetary — whose business model is "debt, slavery, and war": cheap money, compliant labor, profitable wars. Its substance is liberal hegemony, its structure is Constitution-plus-lobby, its agents are clients like Ukraine and Israel, and its purpose is to deny regional hegemony to China and Russia. The empire is in late stage: militarily overextended, captured by a shareholder class, ideologically exhausted by post-Cold-War liberalism. Sympathetic readings of rival "neo-monarchical" projects (Russia, China, Hungary, El Salvador, Singapore, Rwanda) and of the Eurasianist / Mackinder framing run alongside just-war analyses arguing Ukraine is unwinnable, an "Alaska Accords" pivot to contain China, and the reading of Trump as either a Palmerston-style proxy operator or an American Gorbachev whose reforms accidentally collapse the regime they were meant to save. A recent capture names the business model as the Trinity of Empire and proposes a replacement trinity — transparency, tariffs, and the threat of total war — implementable only as a package. The most recent capture states the same business model as a hiring specification: the candidate the donor class is looking for is a "white Obama."

The empire as project: substance, structure, agents, purpose

Aristotle's four causes applied to the American Empire (raw/keep/logos-machine.md):

  • Substanceliberal hegemony. The metaphysical content of the empire: open borders, free trade, rules-based order, sexual liberation. The "four domains of liberalism." (raw/keep/4-domains-of-liberalism.md)
  • StructureConstitution + lobby. The formal constitutional order plus the financial-NGO lobby that animates it from within.
  • Agentclient states and proxies. Ukraine, Israel, the smaller European clients; the search for an India to play the China-proxy.
  • Purposedeny regional hegemony to rival great powers. Russia, China, eventually a free Iran.

Focusing on the agents is the regime's preferred propaganda surface — debate Ukraine, debate Israel — because it leaves the substance and the purpose unexamined. The first analytical move is to see all four causes at once.

The genealogy: founded by Lincoln (the American Lenin), structurally built by FDR (the American Stalin) via the WWII bureaucracy. Atlanticism is its operative ideology — the fusion of US state power (NATO, the alphabet agencies) with US corporate power (the Globally Systemically Important Banks). (raw/keep/conservatives.md, raw/keep/natural-rights.md, raw/keep/wwii-founding-myth.md; full constitutional treatment in constitution-and-american-orders)

The Trinity of Empire

"Empires run on debt slavery and war. Today that means easy to access cheap money, endless inexpensive and compliant labor, and profitable low-cost wars." — raw/keep/trump-and-empire.md

A recent capture names this triad the Trinity of Empire and specifies what it exists to defeat (raw/inbox/2026-07-09t04-13-45-890z-intersectionality-as-rent-seeking.md). Empires borrow money, suppress wages, and use force to take what they can in order to survive. They are therefore structurally opposed to universal truth, distributive justice, and local control — the corpus's own constructive triad — because those three things prevent, respectively, large-scale borrowing from citizens, the import of cheap labor that sustains inefficient business practices, and a local government's ability to decide what is best for the people it serves. The imperial business model is not merely indifferent to the triad; each leg of the empire exists because one leg of the triad has been suppressed.

The three flows in operational terms:

  1. Debt. The dollar as forced global medium with profit repatriation to domestic financial markets ("monetary mercantilism"). Cheap credit funds asset bubbles, consumption lending, and the rolling deficit. (raw/keep/natural-rights.md)
  2. Compliant labor. Cheap migrant labor at the bottom; outsourced industrial labor abroad; credentialed-class labor at the top, locked into urban institutional life by housing, schooling, and healthcare costs. (raw/keep/the-guide-to-the-american-empire.md, raw/keep/transition-to-empire.md)
  3. Profitable low-cost wars. Successful Atlanticist wars — WW2, Cold War, Pacific — built imperial prestige. Failed ones — Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, Ukraine — are how the order is unwinding without yet acknowledging it. (raw/keep/natural-rights.md)

The Sullivan speech (Biden's National Security Advisor) is read as the regime's quiet acknowledgment that 1990s-style hyper-globalization hollowed out US industry, that economic integration failed to make China and Russia "responsible stakeholders," and that imperial maintenance now requires industrial policy, friend-shoring, and supply-chain resilience — i.e., a managed retreat from 1990s globalism dressed as a new consensus. (raw/keep/president-biden-s-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-speech.md)

Transparency, tariffs, and the threat of total war

The same capture proposes a replacement trinity — the three tools that limit an empire's ability to destroy itself, and which together would reorient imperial purpose from extraction toward technical progress that eliminates drudgery and produces broad human flourishing:

  • Transparency forces financial activity into the open where it can be scrutinized and criticized when it merely extracts rents for protected classes.
  • Tariffs protect the regulatory conditions that prevent wage suppression and worker mistreatment.
  • Total war makes military expansion too costly and too mutually destructive to attempt, and thereby prevents it.

Each has a counterfeit form that must be avoided at all costs — selective transparency, tariffs that simply reward incumbents with higher profits, and ugly wars of attrition that can be easily ignored:

  • Selective transparency means protecting the rent-seekers from exposure while forcing others to reveal their profit-maximizing strategies. Amazon is named as the exemplar: it invites competitors into its marketplace, learns how they do business, then competes against them using their private market data. When all transaction data is public, the rewards go to talent and skill rather than to whoever has captured a corner of the market and can exploit it. Extended to the workplace, transparency exposes real skill and creates a market where skill is rewarded, and unions become worker-protection organizations that reward talent and productivity instead of defending membership regardless of ability.
  • Incumbent-protecting tariffs are why tariffs have a bad name: they usually shield local monopolies from more efficient and more talented competitors elsewhere. Used instead to sustain living wages, protect the environment, and promote workplace safety, they become tools of social progress — and under total transparency it becomes trivial to see which use is which.
  • Ignorable wars of attrition are the counterfeit of total war: bullying conflicts small enough that the international order does not punish them. (war-and-violence develops the deterrence argument and its worked cases.)

The three must be implemented together or each fails. A threat of total war coupled with an economic system that steals from taxpayers and workers produces the tragic consequences of an actual total war, as everyone slowly loses faith in their civilization. Tariffs on their own merely protect incumbents, because without transparency nobody can see whose margins they are defending. Transparency on its own weakens the empire and leaves it exposed to predatory regulatory arbitrage and endless wars of attrition from its enemies.

The European legislative program

The capture states a concrete first move, and it is European rather than American:

  • Europe enforces financial and supply-chain transparency on anyone doing business within the European Union. This discloses every competitive advantage that consists merely of rent extraction, wage suppression, or supply-chain protection.
  • Once it is clear how each company operating inside the economic area actually makes its money, tariffs can be applied appropriately to protect living wages, environmental standards, and workplace safety.
  • Open quality standards and published workplace practices let customers make informed choices without regulatory constraints that shield monopolies from competition.
  • The threat of total war protects the economic area from minor incursions by its enemies. Extending the French nuclear umbrella over the whole European economic zone achieves this.
  • Extending both the economic agenda and the nuclear umbrella to include Russia and its former satellites and partners would create a dominant global economic power based on transparency, tariffs, and total war.
  • As workplace standards converge across the zone, the tariffs fade away to nothing, since there is no longer any regulatory arbitrage to protect against.

This is a much more expansive version of the Alaska Accords proposal below. Where the Accords propose a joint Europe-Russia policing arrangement over weak states so that American forces can pivot east, the transparency program proposes an actual economic union with a shared nuclear guarantee — a rival bloc rather than a division of labor within the existing one. The two proposals share a premise (Europe and Russia belong on the same side of the ledger) and differ on whether the object is to relieve American commitments or to replace American hegemony.

The telos: grill and chill

The capture is unusually plain about what the replacement trinity is for. The vast majority of humanity simply wants to grill and chill — to find meaningful activity that occupies the day, that is productive and stimulating, and that permits engagement with community and family in ways that promote flourishing. Flourishing is then specified almost exactly as the corpus's Big Five: steady wealth accumulation, gradual increases in purchasing power, family formation via two-parent households supported by their extended families, increased healthy lifespan, and knowledge accumulation through education and discovery. When the goal of empire becomes technical progress that eliminates drudgery and produces broad flourishing, the trinity of debt, slavery, and war is replaced by the trinity of transparency, tariffs, and the threat of total war. (middle-class-flourishing carries the flourishing metrics; strategy-and-power carries transparency as the un-fascism lever.)

Proxies and the great-power game

Palmerston is the operating template: a liberal great power using proxies to extend imperial influence without committing its own forces. Ukraine vs. Russia. Israel vs. Iran. The open question is who plays the proxy against China — India is the most likely candidate; Vietnam and the Philippines secondary. (raw/keep/palmerston.md, raw/keep/proxy-wars.md)

A good imperial proxy needs two ingredients (raw/keep/the-guide-to-the-american-empire.md):

  • An inferiority complex vis-à-vis the imperial center.
  • Race-based nationalism that lets the imperial brand (Disney, Ralph Lauren, "white-supremacy lite") be sold as aspirational.

"Color revolutions" then break local regulatory control to admit foreign capital. The proxy's local elite acquires Western credentials and asset-management positions; local labor and industry are repriced into the imperial system.

Just-war on Ukraine

Just-war theory requires a reasonable probability of success. Ukraine cannot retake its territory; the West will not commit ground forces; prolonging the war is "pagan vanity, not Christian moral judgment." A negotiated compromise — whatever Trump's motives — meets the moral test that Biden's officials privately knew but publicly denied. (raw/keep/just-war-principles-in-ukraine.md)

"It may be gallant to fight what one knows is a losing battle, but according to just war teaching, doing so reflects pagan vanity, not Christian moral judgment." — raw/keep/just-war-principles-in-ukraine.md

Israel as proxy and as fault line

Israel is read as a useful Zionist-crusader proxy that lets America have a Middle East war without losing American lives. But Israel has split internally into a liberal, secular Israel and a messianic, settler Judea — an internal civil-war condition that destabilizes the proxy from within. (raw/keep/this-independence-day-israel-has-split-into-two-incompatible-jewish-states.md, raw/keep/proxy-wars.md; full treatment in judaism-and-zionism)

Iran

Iran cannot invade anyone and seeks Persian-neutralist regional hegemony. US strategy in the Red Sea is read as "kick the dog until it bites" — fund Houthis, manufacture an incident, justify escalation. A nuclear Iran would invite an Israeli or American strike. The structural goal is to keep Iran constrained without letting it consolidate as a coherent regional power. (raw/keep/iran-strategy.md)

The transparency capture proposes the opposite move on the same board: that Russia should align itself economically with Iran and other allied oil-producing nations and provide a nuclear guarantee against Israeli and American-led NATO-backed aggression in the region, which would immediately force stability, since a negotiated settlement is infinitely preferable to global nuclear war. The corpus therefore now holds two incompatible positions on Iranian deterrence — that a nuclear Iran invites a strike, and that a nuclear guarantee over Iran forces peace. Both are recorded. (war-and-violence)

Heartland, Eurasianism, and the post-Atlanticist alternative

The notes engage the Mackinder / Dugin lineage at length. The world is read through heartland dualism: a continental ideocracy (the heartland — Russia + Slavic + Prussian socialism, in Niekisch's German-Russian "Third Path" formulation) versus Atlanticist plutocracy (the maritime rim). The Eurasianist project orients toward the heartland and toward a multi-civilizational rather than a universal order. (raw/keep/the-metaphysics-of-national-bolshevism.md, raw/keep/4-domains-of-liberalism.md, raw/keep/15-ways-putin-is-better-than-america.md)

This is engaged as diagnosis, not adoption. The point is not that America should become Eurasian; it is that BRICS, the multipolar turn, and the rise of "neo-monarchical" CEO-states (Putin, Xi, Modi, Bukele, Lee Kuan Yew's Singapore) supply intellectual shape to a post-Atlanticist alternative that no longer has to argue against universalism — universalism has already lost. (raw/keep/end-of-history.md, raw/keep/choose-your-empire.md)

"People will very quickly decide that they would rather be governed like Amazon than like Baltimore." — raw/keep/end-of-history.md

Fukuyama's "end of history" was right for the progressive-state-as-force-for-good story. What is being born is a neo-monarchical, corporate-style governance form where shareholder rights replace human rights, and where competence hierarchies and order are the organizing principles.

The transparency program is the sharpest available counter-reading of the same Europe-Russia geometry: rather than a multi-civilizational settlement in which each bloc keeps its own truths, it proposes a single economic zone unified by disclosure standards and defended by a shared nuclear guarantee — universalist in method while multipolar in membership.

How empires fall, and the pivot to China

"Not with a bang but with a whimper. If we look at the end of the last two great world empires, Britain and the USSR we can see how the American empire will end." — raw/keep/how-empires-fall.md

Three weak points (raw/keep/how-empires-fall.md):

  1. Military doctrine — high-tech without infantry. The US can dominate sea, air, and missile dimensions but cannot hold ground without losing political will.
  2. Regulatory capture — by the shareholder class, which extracts rents from the imperial system rather than reinvesting in it.
  3. Domestic Marxism — using race / sex / climate to provoke regime change from within, mirroring the late-Soviet ideological exhaustion.

Suez 1956 is the analogue for British Atlanticism's quiet end; Afghanistan for the USSR's. The US has had its Suez (Iraq / Afghanistan / Ukraine, in slow motion) without yet acknowledging it.

A fourth mechanism now sits alongside these, imported from the corpus's Islamic material: the closing of the gates of ijtihad. When open innovation driven by logos and the search for aletheia is replaced by taqlid — managed innovation designed to protect incumbent interests — the empire loses its capacity to renew itself. The Ottomans fell into this trap after the twelfth century and Rome after the second, and all empires eventually do. Regulatory capture is the economic face of the same closure. (islam, american-religion)

The strategic move proposed: an "Alaska Accords" — a modern Molotov-Ribbentrop in which Europe and Russia jointly police weak states (Ukraine, Moldova, the Caucasus) so US forces can pivot east to contain China. The great strategic error of WWII, on this reading, was Hitler breaking the original pact; the lesson is to keep the pact intact. (raw/keep/pivot-to-china.md)

Trump-as-Palmerston vs. Trump-as-Gorbachev

The two readings of Trump are kept distinct rather than collapsed:

  • Trump-as-Palmerston — a competent operator of the imperial proxy game, pivoting Ukraine into a frozen settlement, redirecting forces toward China, using Israel as the Middle East proxy, and salvaging the imperial business model for another generation. (raw/keep/palmerston.md, raw/keep/trump-and-empire.md)
  • Trump-as-Gorbachev — a reformer whose perestroika exposes the rot, whose glasnost reveals the corruption, and whose attempts to save the regime accidentally trigger USSR-style collapse, after which "a Putin-like figure finally assumes command and restrains the new oligarchs." (raw/keep/conservatives.md, raw/keep/trump-and-empire.md)

The notes treat these as live forks, not predictions. Both are consistent with the available evidence at different time horizons.

"Trump knows that unless he sustains the imperial business model he will become the American Gorbachev." — raw/keep/trump-and-empire.md

A third reading is implicit in the Trinity material: Trump's tariffs and his hostility to foreign wars are two of the three replacement tools, deployed without the third. Tariffs without transparency protect incumbents; a reluctance to fight without a credible total-war threat invites attrition. On the capture's own logic a partial implementation is worse than none, which makes the Trump program a test case for the all-three-together claim.

The search for a white Obama: candidate selection as imperial maintenance

A recent capture states the imperial business model from the personnel side, as a specification for the office rather than a description of the flows (raw/inbox/2026-07-13t05-44-32-600z-the-search-for-white-obama.md). Obama is read as the perfect candidate: smart, educated, dark-skinned, with the precise mix of good manners and code-switching ability that let him move from the vineyard to the hood without losing authenticity in either register.

What the donor class is looking for in 2028 is therefore a white Obama — a code-switching candidate who can credibly relate to an angry middle-class and working-class voter while being sufficiently weak and malleable to be directed by donors who want easy money, cheap labor, and endless wars.

That last clause is the Trinity of Empire word for word, which is what makes the capture belong here rather than in ordinary electoral commentary. The Trinity names what the empire runs on; the white Obama names the qualification a candidate must hold in order to run it — the ability to sell debt, wage suppression, and foreign war to the population that all three are extracting from. The selection criterion is explicitly dual: whoever best appeals to a disaffected working class and keeps the donor class happy.

Two features of the reading matter for the rest of the article.

  • Malleability is the qualification, not the defect. The donor class is not looking for an ally with a compatible program but for a channel that can be redirected as conditions change. On this reading conviction is disqualifying, because a candidate who believes something cannot be turned when the model needs turning.
  • The field crosses the party line. JD Vance, Marco Rubio, Kamala Harris, and Gavin Newsom are named as options for the same post. This is the two-wing reading of american-religion applied to personnel rather than to program: the wings are the auditions and the office is one.

Read against the Palmerston / Gorbachev fork, the white-Obama specification cuts in an uncomfortable direction. Both of those readings treat the officeholder as an agent with a project — sustaining the model deliberately, or exposing it accidentally. The white-Obama reading treats the office as a role for which applicants are screened, in which case neither project is the candidate's to choose, and the fork is a question about which way the channel happens to be pointed rather than about what the man intends. The corpus holds all three and should not pretend they are the same kind of claim.

The capture is a reading of a candidate pool rather than an argument, and the article records it as such. The code-switching account of Obama is asserted; the donor class is named as a class rather than as identifiable principals; and a frame in which any candidate's working-class appeal counts as evidence of donor selection has no obvious falsification condition — which is the discipline of naming agents precisely that the corpus insists on elsewhere. (strategy-and-power develops the same material as the wolf the aggrieved majority hires, and the countermeasure available to a movement with a real base.)

The long European frame

Several notes pull the analysis back to deeper European structures (raw/keep/sanctum-imperium.md, raw/keep/history-of-europe.md, raw/keep/inverted-empires.md, raw/keep/neo-atlanticism.md):

  • Westphalia 1648 — the settlement that traded religious universalism for state sovereignty, with which Atlanticist universalism is now in tension.
  • Augsburg 1555 — earlier cuius regio, eius religio, the ancestor of pluralist localism.
  • Vienna 1815 — the Concert of Europe as multipolar restraint, which Atlanticism inherited and then exhausted.
  • 1956 Suez — the moment British Atlanticism formally hands the baton to American Atlanticism without admitting it.
  • Maastricht / Brussels — the post-1992 EU as the most fully realized administrative-state form, against which French and Italian post-liberal turns are reactions. The transparency program is notable for proposing to use exactly this administrative capacity rather than dismantle it.

The takeaway: empire and magisterium have always been distinct; the modern condition where the imperial state tries to play magisterium itself (the Constitution as Protestant magisterium, civil rights as civic religion) is structurally unstable.

Standing problems and gaps

  • Trump-as-Palmerston vs. Trump-as-Gorbachev is the central live disagreement and the notes explicitly oscillate between them. The article should keep both, not resolve them.
  • Agent with a project vs. applicant for a post. The white-Obama specification treats the presidency as a screened role and malleability as its chief qualification, which makes both Trump readings claims about the direction of a channel rather than about the intentions of a man. The corpus has not said which register it means.
  • The donor class as a named agent. The capture attributes a coherent hiring preference to a class without identifying principals, and any candidate's working-class appeal can be read as evidence of the selection. The frame is powerful and hard to test, and it strains the corpus's own commitment to naming agents precisely.
  • Anti-colonial America vs. imperial-by-design America. raw/keep/neo-atlanticism.md keeps the older self-image of America as escape from European empire; raw/keep/conservatives.md reads America as imperial from Lincoln onward. Both are present; both are partly true.
  • Just-war vs. cold realism. The just-war Ukraine analysis speaks Christian moral realism; the Alaska Accords / Palmerston frame is amoral great-power calculation. The total-war deterrent deepens the split rather than resolving it, since a deterrent whose credibility rests on the promise of indiscriminate destruction cannot be grounded in a doctrine of discrimination and proportionality.
  • Two positions on Iranian deterrence. The Iran-strategy note holds that a nuclear Iran invites a strike; the transparency capture holds that a Russian nuclear guarantee over Iran forces regional peace. These cannot both be right about the same board, and the corpus has not chosen.
  • The package problem. Transparency, tariffs, and total war are said to work only together, and no actor is named who could implement all three. The European program supplies an implementer for two of them and borrows the third from France's arsenal; what institution coordinates the package, and what prevents it from becoming the selective-transparency regime it is designed to replace, is unaddressed.
  • A screened candidate cannot implement a package. If the office is filled by whoever is most redirectable, then the replacement trinity has no available implementer in American politics by construction — which either strengthens the case for the European route or means the trinity requires a candidate the selection process is designed to exclude.
  • Anti-administrative rhetoric vs. the EU as instrument. The corpus treats Brussels as the most fully realized administrative-state form and a thing to be resisted, then proposes enforcing continent-wide supply-chain disclosure through exactly that apparatus. Either administrative capacity is legitimate when its output is disclosure rather than homogenization, or the proposal is in tension with the localist commitments elsewhere in the compendium.
  • Tariffs that fade away. The claim that tariffs dissolve once standards converge assumes convergence, and every real tariff regime has produced a constituency that prevents it. The corpus's own diagnosis — that regulatory monopolies are what capture protects — predicts the opposite outcome.
  • The Sullivan speech is summarized but not directly contested. The notes treat post-1990s industrial policy as imperial-decline acknowledgment without arguing that the new consensus is actually durable — and without noticing that friend-shoring plus industrial policy is a partial, incumbent-serving version of the tariff plank.
  • BRICS and de-dollarization are referenced but not analyzed; the financial mechanics of imperial transition (CBDCs, BRICS clearing, eurodollar unwind) are an obvious next gap.
  • China from inside. The notes treat China as a foil, not a project. There is no symmetrical reading of CCP ideology, of Confucian-Leninist statecraft, or of how China experiences Atlanticist containment — and the transparency program, which would exclude China from the zone by construction, does not say what China does in response.
  • Israel/Judea split and proxy fitness. If a proxy fractures internally, does it still serve imperial function? The notes don't say — possibly because the answer is yes, with rising costs, but the analysis is missing.
  • Dugin sympathy and Catholic commitments sit uneasily. National Bolshevism, Eurasianism, and the messianic Russian frame are treated as illuminating; the magisterial-Catholic and natural-rights commitments elsewhere want a thinner, more Westphalian frame. The compatibility is asserted, not worked out.

Related

  • political-philosophy — the regime diagnosis the empire analysis presupposes; the New Conservative form that emerges as Atlanticism recedes.
  • constitution-and-american-orders — the Imperial 1940 layer atop the formal constitutional orders; the labor-capital conflict written into the separation of powers that the Trinity funds.
  • strategy-and-power — apophatic strategy, peak power, and the question of how an imperial transition is actually engineered; transparency as the un-fascism lever; the white Obama as the wolf an aggrieved majority hires.
  • war-and-violence — total war as deterrent; the just-war register against which the deterrent strains.
  • american-religion — the Constitution-as-Protestant-magisterium analogy; "American Islam" as imperial civil religion; the two asset-position intersectionalities; veritas against aletheia.
  • money-debt-finance — dollar hegemony, GSIBs, monetary mercantilism, supply-chain arbitrage, and the financial mechanics of empire.
  • islam — the gates of ijtihad and the turn to taqlid as the innovation-closure mechanism of imperial decline.
  • middle-class-flourishing — the flourishing specification the replacement trinity is aimed at.
  • localism-and-federalism — local control as the third leg of the triad the Trinity of Empire suppresses.
  • catholicity — magisterium-vs-imperium, the universalist alternative the empire pretends to and the Church actually carries.

Sources

  • raw/keep/the-guide-to-the-american-empire.md
  • raw/keep/the-metaphysics-of-national-bolshevism.md
  • raw/keep/president-biden-s-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-speech.md
  • raw/keep/how-empires-fall.md
  • raw/keep/trump-and-empire.md
  • raw/keep/just-war-principles-in-ukraine.md
  • raw/keep/choose-your-empire.md
  • raw/keep/pivot-to-china.md
  • raw/keep/palmerston.md
  • raw/keep/proxy-wars.md
  • raw/keep/geopolitical-freedom-tests.md
  • raw/keep/this-independence-day-israel-has-split-into-two-incompatible-jewish-states.md
  • raw/keep/iran-strategy.md
  • raw/keep/15-ways-putin-is-better-than-america.md
  • raw/keep/end-of-history.md
  • raw/keep/4-domains-of-liberalism.md
  • raw/keep/neo-atlanticism.md
  • raw/keep/wwii-founding-myth.md
  • raw/keep/byzantine-arab.md
  • raw/keep/transition-to-empire.md
  • raw/keep/sanctum-imperium.md
  • raw/keep/history-of-europe.md
  • raw/keep/inverted-empires.md
  • raw/keep/conservatives.md
  • raw/keep/natural-rights.md
  • raw/keep/logos-machine.md
  • raw/inbox/2026-07-09t04-13-45-890z-intersectionality-as-rent-seeking.md
  • raw/inbox/2026-07-13t05-44-32-600z-the-search-for-white-obama.md